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Fictional names have specifi c, cognitively relevant features, putting 
them in a category apart from the category of ordinary names. I argue 
that we should focus on the name or name form itself and refrain from 
looking for an assignment procedure and an assigned referent. I also 
argue that we should reject the idea that sentences containing fi ctional 
names express singular propositions. These suggestions have important 
consequences for the intuition that ‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ is either true 
or false, and they put our intuitions concerning fi ctional names into per-
spective. If Millianism is the view that names only have a referent only 
as their semantic value, then my proposal on fi ctional names is not Mil-
lian in nature.
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1. Fictional Names and Existence
It is widely assumed that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a fi ctional name, that 
is, a name introduced in fi ction, and a name with no referent in the 
real world (see Kripke 1980; Kripke 2011; Kripke 2013).1 If a fi ctional 
name such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’ originates in fi ction and has no three-
dimensional referent located in space and time then, on the orthodox 
analysis of names, the name lacks a referent. Prima facie, it has no 
semantic value. As a consequence ‘sentences containing it say nothing’ 
(Braun 1993: 449). However, intuitively sentences such as
      (1) Sherlock Holmes exists
are true or false, and convey information we can agree or disagree 
about; e.g., you and I may disagree about whether or not (1) is true. 
1 There is a distinction to be made between fi ctional names, like ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’, and names of imaginary friend, or fantastic creature (‘Nessie’), the speaker 
wrongly believes to exist and to be the referent of that name. My paper concerns 
fi ctional names only.
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You can even argue that
      (2) Sherlock Holmes does not exist.
is true. However, just like (1), (2) says nothing and expresses no propo-
sition. Thus, it has no truth conditions and it is neither true nor false. I 
am interested in singular existential and negative singular existential 
sentences containing fi ctional names, like (1) and (2). The question, 
then, is in determining how such sentences can be truth-apt despite 
the fact that, intuitively, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ lacks a real world referent. 
Furthermore, how can someone believe that (1), or (2), is either true or 
false if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ has no referent in the real world? Why do we 
disagree if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ has no referent? What is our disagree-
ment about? Problems concerning fi ctional names are, arguably, se-
mantic in nature, concerning key semantics notions such as reference 
and truth.2 People have a strong inclination to model fi ctional names on 
ordinary names—i.e., to think about ‘Sherlock Holmes’ as analogous to 
ordinary proper names such as ‘Barack Obama’, and are subsequently 
tempted to assign referents to fi ctional names as well. Following the 
now orthodox view on names, an utterance of (1), or (2), expresses a sin-
gular proposition just as an utterance of ‘Obama exists’ expresses the 
singular proposition <OBAMA, exists>, which contains Obama himself 
as a constituent. The problem is that there is purportedly no such thing 
as Sherlock Holmes to be introduced into a proposition (see Braun 
2005; Adams 2011). Many philosophers have tried to account for fi c-
tional names (see Kripke 2013; Currie 1990; Walton 1990; Thomasson 
1990; Braun 2005; Adams 2011; Kroon 2014). In section 3, I will sketch 
and criticize two main, paradigmatic perspectives on such names and 
fi ctional sentence—a ‘pretense’ perspective (Kripke, Walton) and an 
empty proposition perspective (Braun).3
Ordinary and fi ctional names differ in many important ways. In 
contrast with ordinary names, fi ctional names are not assigned to in-
dividuals by ordinary speakers the way that ‘Barack Obama’ is. More-
over, fi ctional names should not be characterized simply by the fact 
that they lack a three-dimensional referent in the real world, which 
can be a constituent of a singular proposition. To give them a purely 
negative characteristic only lays ground for an oversimplifi ed picture 
of such names. Fictional names have specifi c, cognitively relevant fea-
tures, putting them in a category apart from the category of ordinary 
names. In section 2, I introduce ordinary names and fi ctional names, 
and two problems raised by fi ctional names. Section 3 briefl y discusses, 
2 There is an important literature on fi ctional names and existence, e.g. Kripke 
(2011; 2013); Walton (1990; 2000); Braun (2005); Everett (2003; 2007). Everett and 
Hofweber’s Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzle of Non-Existence provides a good 
collection of articles on the problem.
3 There are too many different views on fi ctional names and existence to deal 
with in a short paper. Moreover, my paper is not intended as a criticism of these 
views, but as a new, modest contribution to what remains a puzzling issue.
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fi rst Kripke’s suggestion invoking pretense. Calling it pretense suggest 
that it is not literal. If I am right, singular existential sentences are lit-
eral, and the idea of pretense should be dispensed with. I discuss, sec-
ond, Braun’s view. The point here is to reject views according to which 
fi ctional names make room for an object in a proposition, while leaving 
this room not fi lled. Section 4 introduces the framework I use, pluri-
propositionalism. Section 5 sketches my perspective on what fi ctional 
names are. Section 6 applies pluri-propositionalism to fi ctional names 
in existence sentences, and offers solutions to the problems presented 
in section 3. Section 7 concludes the paper. I argue that we should focus 
on the name or name form—that is, its written form—itself and refrain 
from looking for an assignment procedure and an assigned referent. 
I also argue that we should reject the idea that sentences containing 
fi ctional names express singular propositions. These suggestions will 
have consequences for the intuition that (1) is either true or false, and 
put our intuitions concerning fi ctional names into perspective. If Mil-
lianism is the view that names have only a referent as their semantic 
value, then my proposal on fi ctional names is not Millian in nature. 
I argue that by abandoning the analogy perspective certain problems 
raised by existence sentences such as (1) and (2) can be addressed in a 
novel way.
From the perspective of someone reading a fi ctional story containing 
fi ctional names, fi ctional names behave like regular names. This is part 
of what explains why reading fi ction is an enjoyable activity. Fiction 
readers use their imagination, as they read the fi ctional story, to cre-
ate a picture of what the individual designated by such a name would 
be like. I read Hammett’s books, and I have a picture of Sam Spade; 
you read the same book and you (most) probably have a different pic-
ture of Sam Spade. However, outside of the enjoyment that it provides 
while reading fi ction, it is not really appropriate in semantics to see 
fi ctional names as ordinary names. Discussions about existence sen-
tences such as (1) usually take fi ctional names to be just that, names, 
thereby disregarding the aspects that make them fi ctional names—as-
pects which distinguish them from ordinary names such as ‘Barack 
Obama’, for instance. Standard analyses place too much emphasis on 
‘exists’ rather than on the fi ctional name itself in (1). Locutions such 
as ‘exists in fi ction’ are frequently invoked to avoid an array of prob-
lems that are raised by ‘exists’ where fi ctional names are involved. My 
approach does just the opposite: it emphasizes fi ctional names.4 The 
category of a fi ctional name deserves special attention, and it can be 
characterized in an epistemically fruitful way, echoing speaker’s intu-
itions. Once fi ctional names are considered, ‘exists’—as well as ‘exists 
in fi ction’—takes a back seat and is innocuous.
4 With, as a result, evading complex issues concerning existence examined by 
Predelli (2002).
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2. Ordinary and Fictional Names
According to the Theory of Direct Reference (Kripke 1980), the sole 
semantic function of a name, e.g., ‘John Smith’, is to refer to an indi-
vidual, e.g., John Smith, and a name’s sole semantic value is the indi-
vidual it is assigned to. The general principle underlying this view is 
the assignment of a value to a variable: the latter being the sequence of 
sounds or the sequence of letters playing the role of a name, while the 
relevant value is the bearer of such a name, e.g., John Smith. On this 
picture, the sentence ‘John Smith is a detective’ expresses a singular 
proposition which contains the individual the name is assigned to (i.e., 
John Smith) and the property of being a detective as constituents: < 
JOHN SMITH, being detective>. Clearly, many people bear the name 
‘John Smith’. Although it may seem as though a single name gets dif-
ferent individuals assigned to it as its various values, it is arguable 
that we, in fact, have different names. According to this theory, multi-
ple instances of ‘John Smith’ are to be counted as homonymous expres-
sions with each name being individuated by its semantic value (i.e., the 
individual). A sentence containing the name ‘John Smith’ expresses a 
singular proposition containing the specifi c individual that the name is 
assigned to. This singular proposition provides the truth conditions of 
the sentence. If a phonetically identical name is assigned to a different 
person, then there are two different names, which contribute two dif-
ferent referents to the propositions expressed by sentences containing 
them. These sentences express two different singular propositions and 
therefore have distinct truth conditions.
Philosophers of language usually address the problem of fi ctional 
names directly, and usually treat them as names just like any other 
names. If fi ctional names are similar to ordinary names but lack a ref-
erent, then analyzing them like ordinary names via the direct refer-
ence paradigm leads to the result that the proposition that the sen-
tence determines is, at best, the incomplete proposition: <    , exists>. 
An affi rmation of the existence of Holmes does not, then, make much 
sense. Nevertheless, the question of whether or not Sherlock Holmes 
exists seems to persist. Moreover, if a fi ctional name has no semantic 
value, then it cannot be individuated by it. It then becomes diffi cult to 
draw a distinction between the name of Doyle’s famous 19th century 
detective and the name of his also famous 21st century counterpart in 
a television series. Which Sherlock Holmes is the existential question 
about? Is it about the 19th century detective, or about its 21st century 
counterpart? Or is it about another Sherlock Holmes? Unless further 
details are added, these questions remain diffi cult to answer, if they 
can be answered at all. Fictional names, in contrast with names such 
as ‘Vulcan’, do not seem to lack a referent because a mistake happened 
when assigning the name. Fictional names are, arguably, not designed 
to designate an object located in space and time—that is why the name 
is fi ctional to begin with (Kripke 2013). In this respect, one cannot re-
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ally say that a fi ctional name ‘fails to refer’ since there is no object it 
is supposed to refer to in the fi rst place. Fictional names are not mere 
empty names. I will address fi ctional names in an indirect way in sec-
tion 5.
Many competent speakers are inclined to judge both (1) and (2) as 
true. Herein lies a puzzle: assuming that we are talking about the same 
Sherlock Holmes, prima facie our intuitions to judge both (1) and (2) 
to be true leads to a contradiction, since Sherlock Holmes cannot exist 
and not exist at the same time. However, perhaps the puzzle is mis-
guided, since ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does not designate anything. Let’s call 
this the contradiction problem. Some may argue that there is a sense in 
which Sherlock Holmes does exist and another sense in which he does 
not. But this is just a description of the problem.
Plausibly, Donald Trump believes that Sherlock Holmes does not 
exist. One can then ask what he believes exactly if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
is a fi ctional name. One can also ask which Sherlock Holmes is his 
belief about? Is Trump’s belief about the Doyle character in his 19th 
century novel or about the character in the television series? Or about 
both, assuming that they are one and the same? In any case, his belief 
is not about a three-dimensional, real individual. Presumably Obama 
also believes that Sherlock Holmes does not exist. Which Sherlock Hol-
mes is his belief about? Do Trump and Obama share a belief in com-
mon? Let’s call this the belief attribution problem. Intuitions about the 
truth conditions of existential statements about fi ctional characters 
are complex (see Braun 1993; Thomasson 2003; Predelli 2002). Braun 
(2005) is right in noting that speakers have a cognitive relationship to 
fi ctional names ‘that [is] importantly similar to the cognitive relations 
they bear to referring names’ (Braun 2005: 600). However, Braun also 
suggests that they are not entirely analogous. Neither (1) nor (2) are 
made true by facts, since prima facie facts drop out of the picture as 
far as sentences containing fi ctional names are concerned. Existential 
statements, such as (1) and (2), need to be more aptly analyzed.
3. Using the Ordinary Name Paradigm
There is an important literature on fi ctional names invoking pretense 
(see for example Kripke (2013); Walton (1990; 2000); Kroon (2014)). 
Call it the pretense family type of theory. In Reference and Existence 
(2013), Kripke writes that ‘the type of names which occurs in fi ctional 
discourse are pretended names’, and that ‘the propositions in which 
they occur are pretended proposition rather than real propositions’ 
(Kripke 2013: 29). The speaker does not, then, literally refer to an ob-
ject or express a proposition. The speaker only pretends to use the name 
and to express a proposition. Such a view does not entail that pretend 
names refer to fi ctional objects.5 Suppose now that fi ctional names are 
5 Let’s suppose that fi ctional names do refer to fi ctional objects, a view which 
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pretended names, and that sentences containing such names do not 
determine propositions, but just pretended propositions. We are owed 
details on what a pretended name is, and on what pretended proposi-
tions are. An approach to fi ctional names preserving the intuitions that 
such names are actual names, not pretended names, and that such 
sentences express propositions, not pretended propositions, would have 
much in its favour. Walton (1990) also uses the notions of pretense, as 
well as the notion of make-belief, and resists the intuition that (1) and 
(2) are literal, or used literally. He offers a very rich view on fi ctional 
name sentences. I will not offer detailed criticisms of Walton’s picture. 
My view dispenses with the notion of pretense and takes sentences 
containing fi ctional names to be literal.
A different strategy, or family of strategies, is to argue that fi ctional 
names are, in fact, referring expressions, but that they refer to noth-
ing. The way out is to argue that such names lack referent, and that 
a sentence like (1) expresses a gappy proposition, e.g., <___ , exists>, 
(Braun 2005). Braun argues forcefully for this position, and he sug-
gests what the truth conditions are for both (1) and its negation, here 
(2). He would contend that the gappy proposition determined by (1) 
is false, and that its negation is true (see Braun 2005: 599).6 Falsity 
is used in an odd sense here, in that it does not consider facts. As-
signing falsity to (1) seem arbitrary. On this view, a sentence such as 
‘Donald Trump believes that Sherlock Holmes exists’ is a belief report 
containing a gappy proposition. If the gappy proposition is false, and 
if its negation is therefore true, then the sentence ‘Donald Trump be-
lieves that Sherlock Holmes does not exists’ is true, and it attributes to 
Trump a true belief. This does not seem correct.7 Braun’s picture, leave 
many questions unanswered. According to his view, different sentences 
containing different fi ctional names—‘Sherlock Holmes exists’, ‘Philip 
Marlow exists’ and ‘Martin Beck exists’—determine the same gappy 
proposition and share the same truth conditions. Important differences 
are obliterated. In addition, ‘Sherlock Holmes is not Philip Marlow’ and 
‘Martin Beck is not Sherlock Holmes’, as well as ‘Sherlock Holmes is 
not Martin Beck’, determine the same gappy proposition: < ___ is not 
___ >. Prima facie, they determine different propositions and have dif-
has been defended quite strongly in the literature (see Thomasson 1990). However, 
it is often assumed that such fi ctional characters either exist or do not exist. This 
assumption just begs the question, and it is not a satisfactory response to puzzles 
such as (1) and (2). We are also owed an account of how fi ctional names are assigned 
to such fi ctional objects, whatever the latter are supposed to be Moreover, if the 
name refers to a fi ctional object, then the truth conditions of (1), or an utterance of 
(1), for instance, then remain puzzling. How can a fi ctional object make a sentence 
true, in a non pickwikian sense of ‘true’? Are (1) and (2) contradictions? For a critical 
perspective on Thomasson’view, see Everett (2007).
6 Adams (2011) argues for gappy propositions, but in contrast with Braun, he 
contends that gappy propositions, determined by a sentence like (1), are neither true 
nor false. If he is right, then (1) and (2) are not contradictions.
7 I will not examine Braun’s proposal in detail here.
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ferent truth conditions. Braun’s view seems to imply, against intuitive 
judgements, exactly the opposite: that they determine the same gappy 
proposition.
Most of the various approaches to fi ctional names address issues 
concerning their reference and their contribution to the truth condi-
tions of sentences containing them. They are mainly designed to deal 
with the truth-value problem. I will not try to give details on how such 
approaches deal with the contradiction problem and the belief attribu-
tion problem. Other important issues can also be raised. For example, 
do fi ctional names contingently lack a referent? What are the features 
of fi ctional names that make these expressions referential terms, which 
nevertheless lack a referent? Such lack of referent is prima facie not ac-
cidental (see Kripke 1980). If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is found to have a refer-
ent, then that name does not count as a fi ctional name. Being fi ctional is 
arguably not a contingent feature of fi ctional names. Finally, different 
uses of ‘John Smith’ can be individuated distinctly so long as the name 
is tied to different objects. Different ‘Sherlock Holmes’ can be found in 
Doyle’s book, in movies and in the television series. Are they differ-
ent names? If they lack referents then they cannot be individuated. To 
avoid the problems that these questions raise, some philosophers, such 
as Braun, suggest taking the modes of presentation, the names them-
selves, ‘Sherlock Holmes’, used to express that proposition as relevant 
for distinguishing the proposition and truth conditions associated with 
each sentence or utterance. Such a procedure, however, cannot distin-
guish some pairs of fi ctional names. Suppose that, impressed by Conan 
Doyle’s books, I decide to write mystery novels, and Berlin in 2018 is 
a great place for a mystery. I also decide to call my German detective 
‘Sherlock Holmes.’ Now, two tokens or utterances of the sentence (1), 
one about Conan Doyle’s detective and the other about the Berlin cop, 
determine the same gappy proposition. They prima facie also contain 
the same name, i.e., ‘Sherlock Holmes’. The name, by itself, is useless 
in distinguishing what proposition is determined by each sentence or 
utterance. Such a result is counterintuitive. A more fi ne-grained indi-
viduation of fi ctional names is called for, one not invoking any fi ctional 
character. Braun, for instance, addresses neither the identity problem 
for fi ctional names nor the problem of the multiplicity of similar fi c-
tional names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in Doyle’s books or in a television 
series. The individuation of fi ctional names is puzzling, yet it is also 
relevant in addressing sentences such as (1) and (2). 
In a passage I quoted earlier, Braun (2006) suggests that the cogni-
tive relations ordinary speakers have to fi ctional names are not exactly 
the same as the relations they have to fi ctional names when the speak-
ers know that a name is fi ctional. On this point I believe that Braun is 
right. Linguistically competent or informed speakers know that there 
is a difference between ordinary and fi ctional names—e.g., that there is 
a difference between the name ‘Frank Serpico’ and the name ‘Sherlock 
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Holmes’. The fi rst one is a real name, and the second one is a fi ctional 
name. They also know that ‘Frank Serpico is a detective’ and ‘Sherlock 
Holmes is a detective’ are, in some way, at odds. Consider an utterance 
such as ‘Frank Serpico is a detective, and so is Sherlock Holmes’. Such 
an utterance is quite complex. The difference between these names 
does not simply trace back to their referential aspects. Features of fi c-
tional names make it such that they do not refer to objects. In addition, 
fi ctional names have a specifi c cognitive impact on speakers, an im-
pact quite distinct from the cognitive impact of ordinary names. Before 
examining fi ctional names, let me introduce the pluri-propositionalist 
framework that I will be using. Such a framework provides interesting 
ways to address the issues raised by fi ctional names.
4. The Many Truth Conditions
In philosophy of language, the idea that each sentence or utterance 
determines one single proposition, or mono-propositionalism, is para-
digmatic. It is found in Frege’s pioneering work and in most of the sub-
sequent views. Pluri-propositionalism offers a different perspective on 
sentences and utterances. Following pluri-propositionalism (see Perry 
2012; Korta and Perry 2011), utterances rather sentences are in the 
foreground. In this respect, pluri-propositionalism focuses on linguis-
tic communication. It also argues that many different propositions or 
truth conditions can be determined by a single utterance of a sentence. 
Linguistic expressions have linguistic meaning, that is, a rule deter-
mining the content of utterances of those expressions. Meaning fi xes 
the semantically determined proposition, content, or truth conditions 
of utterances.8 Consider for example an utterance of
      (3) Meryl Streep exists.
The utterance, u, of (3) is individuated by the speaker, the time, say 
May 16, 2018, and the location of the utterance, say San Francisco. 
‘Meryl Streep’ is an ordinary proper name. Following the Theory of 
Direct Reference, it has no linguistic meaning and a referent only. The 
name is associated with a referent by a convention. These features are 
echoed in an understanding of the utterance. Being linguistically com-
petent and relying on their knowledge of language only, including their 
knowledge of what a proper name is, speakers know that:
 Given that (3) is an English sentence, the utterance u of (3) is 
true if and only if the individual9 that the convention exploited 
by the utterance u allows us to designate by ‘Meryl Streep’ ex-
ists.
8 For simplifi cation, I do not make a difference between spoken and written 
utterances of a sentence or a name.
9 An individual is whatever is designated by a proper name.
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Meryl Streep does not have to exist to obtain such content. The speaker 
does not even have to know who Meryl Streep is. The content of the 
semantically determined truth conditions of the utterance, without 
considering facts, accounts for the cognitive signifi cance of the utter-
ance (Perry 2012). Note that the name itself is part of the cognitive 
signifi cance of the utterance. Different utterances of (3) have differ-
ent cognitive signifi cance, because each contains a different utterance. 
Such contents can be accepted as true. Accepting such contents as true 
is an attitude toward the utterance or the content of the utterance. The 
latter itself cannot be said to be true, because facts have not been in-
troduced. If the cognitive signifi cance classifi es as an episode of think-
ing, we can take the latter to be in the speaker’s head. Such content 
contains the utterance u itself as a constituent and is, hence, refl exive 
in relation to the utterance itself. I underline the fact that the name 
itself, ‘Meryl Streep’, is mentioned in the cognitive signifi cance of the 
utterance giving it, as an object, a major cognitive role. What follows ‘if 
and only if’, and precedes ‘exists’, captures an important aspect of the 
reference or designation relation. Yet, what you then understand when 
hearing an utterance of (3) does not depend on the referent of the name 
on that particular utterance. Actually, at this stage the referent plays 
no role at all. The name is associated with a convention tying it to a real 
individual, MERYL STREEP herself, that is: after taking into account 
facts required for fi xing the designation of referring terms,
 Given that (3) is an English sentence, the utterance u of (3) is 
true if and only if MERYL STREEP exists.
‘MERYL STREEP exists’ is the designational content of the utterance, 
giving the conditions under which the utterance is true given the facts. 
The designational content of the utterance of (3) does not contain the 
utterance of that sentence. Neither does it contain the name. The des-
ignated individual has that feature, i.e., it exists or not, independently 
of whether or not there is an utterance at all, and whether or not that 
name has been assigned to that individual. All utterances of (3) with 
that specifi c name associated with the same convention have the same 
designational content and, given the facts, are true. In contrast with or-
dinary names, fi ctional names do not designate real objects, and prima 
facie an utterance of (1) does not have designational content. Therefore, 
they do not introduce anything to the truth conditions of sentences or 
utterances of which they are a part. Yet, the cognitive signifi cance of 
utterances containing fi ctional names remains on the table. 
5. Introducing Fictional Names
It is assumed that fi ctional names have no referent in the real world. 
It is also widely agreed that there are no ordinary speakers introduc-
ing them into discourse. One must make a clear distinction between 
the author of the fi ction, Conan Doyle, Dostoievky, or Marcel Proust 
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for instance, and the fi ctive narrator, the latter introducing fi ctional 
names in the fi ction itself. Such a distinction is part of the tools used 
by authors, and it is standard in the literature on fi ction. Doyle, the 
author, created the Holmes stories; Watson, the fi ctive narrator, tells 
them and introduces, and uses as well, ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Doyle never 
met Watson, and vice-versa. If it were discovered that a novel, previ-
ously thought to have been told by a fi ctive narrator—Watson—turned 
out to be the work of the author himself—Doyle—it would not be fi cti-
tious novel anymore. If Doyle’s mysteries were, in fact, autobiograph-
ical, they would not be fi ctional. In the philosophy of language, the 
distinction between the author and the fi ctive narrator is not always 
clearly made or it is simply ignored altogether. My suggestion takes it 
into account.
Whereas ordinary names are simple entities lacking meaning, and 
are individuated by a sequence of phonemes and an object assigned 
to it by another three-dimensional creature, fi ctional names lack both 
meaning and a referent. There is no name assignment of a fi ctional 
name by a real person. Fictional names are certainly individuated by a 
sequence of sounds or letters. But that is clearly not enough, and it is 
insuffi cient to distinguish the name of the famous Doyle detective and, 
say, the name of a character in a different fi ction. Nonetheless, readers 
individuate fi ctional names, and can see a difference between ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’, the name of the famous detective, and ‘Sherlock Holmes’, the 
name of a different character, say, a sailor in a fi ction. Furthermore, 
if no fi ctive narrator introduces a fi ctional name in fi ction, then there 
is no fi ctional name at all. If Watson does not use ‘Sherlock Holmes’, it 
is diffi cult to say something about Sherlock Holmes. An author using 
created names, without fi ctive narrators, is not introducing fi ctional 
names. Arguably, fi ctive narrators can also use the name of real people, 
or ordinary names, like ‘Aristotle’ or ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’, despite the 
fact that these are not fi ctional names. I propose to individuate fi ctional 
names by taking the source of the name in fi ction into account -Watson 
in a Doyle mystery for instance, and any book will do here. I do not 
want to explore the specifi cs of particular fi ctional names. My aim is 
more general and, up to a point, detached from literary theory. 
The name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is introduced by Watson, a fi ctive nar-
rator, in Doyle’s mysteries, and ‘William de Baskerville’ is introduced 
by Adso of Melk, also a fi ctive narrator, in Eco’s The name of the rose. I 
want to draw attention to the fact that neither Kripke, nor Thomasson 
or Braun, the main contemporary theorists concerned with fi ctional 
names, gives fi ctive narrators a role. They all take only the actual au-
thors into consideration. Philosophers of language ignore the semantic 
impact of what is a major literary element. The name of the author, 
or the title of the book, is sometimes used to focus on and identify the 
relevant fi ctional name. Real objects are then relied on to zoom in on 
a specifi c fi ctional name and, as things happen, on a character. That 
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does not imply that it—the title of the book for example—individuates 
that name. Fictional names are not introduced in the usual way that 
ordinary names are in language. A fi ctional name is never assigned 
a three-dimensional entity having causal relationships with other ob-
jects because, obviously, the fi ctive narrator, being fi ctive, has never 
met any.10 A fi ctional name is also individuated in a very specifi c way. 
Let me explain.
Consider the sentence
      (4) Holmes was certainly not a diffi cult man to live with.
‘Holmes’ can be an ordinary name (e.g., the name of a London taxi driv-
er) or a fi ctional name. A token of (4) retains no information about its 
origins. Tokens of names, like those in (4), can be found in very differ-
ent places, including Chinese cookies, books, and songs. An utterance 
is an event, which is located in space and time, and is the production 
of a sentence by a speaker. An utterance of (4) keeps no trace of its 
speaker, nor its space and time parameters. A sentence such as (4) can 
be uttered and unless you are in contact with the original utterance, 
these parameters remain unknown. As a consequence, no one can tell 
whether ‘Holmes’ is a fi ctional name or not. Now, if I tell you that that 
token came from a mystery novel, A Study in Scarlet, by Arthur Conan 
Doyle, you are informed that it is a token originating in fi ction. Let’s 
call this the source of the fi ctional name. You know something extra-
linguistic about the token of the name. The sentence is reproduced in 
different copies of the book, and you can confi dently expect to fi nd that 
sentence, or more precisely tokens of that sentence, in every copy of 
that book. It is defi nitely not like an ordinary token. Common sense 
suggests that this is not an autobiography and that Doyle is not the 
fi ctive narrator. Maybe you remember your literature classes and you 
know that Watson is the narrator. If you do not, you just call the sto-
ryteller ‘the narrator’. If you know a little bit more about that piece of 
literature, you also know that ‘Holmes’ is a fi ctional name. This is part 
of your knowledge of that name. You also know that that name, in ev-
ery token of that sentence, in every copy of the book, is a fi ctional name. 
Fictional names have identifying features, which trace back to their 
source—e.g., a Doyle mystery. That token, and the name, was not de-
signed to be located in the 17th century, and it was not designed to come 
from China or Japan. Watson, a fi ctive narrator, wrote in London at the 
end of the 19th century, and you read it in A Study in Scarlet. Neither 
(1) nor (2) are specifi c about the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ they contain. 
There is different fi ctional ‘Sherlock Holmes’. I will come back to it.
The sentence (4) is a fi ction sentence. The sentence is indexed to a 
narrator, the fi ctional Watson, a time (end of 19th century), and a loca-
tion (i.e., London). Call this its fi ctional index. These are part of what 
10 One can easily imagine a fi ction without fi ctional names. Just substitute a 
defi nite or an indefi nite description to each and every fi ctional name, in A Study in 
Scarlet for example.
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makes it is a fi ctional sentence. The fi ctional index gives individuat-
ing features of the fi ction sentence.11 The fi ction sentence keeps its fi c-
tional index even in different copies of the book, in graffi ti, written on 
pieces of paper in Chinese cookie, etc. Different tokens of that sentence 
share the same fi ctional index. I think that fi ctional names are complex 
objects individuated by a sequence of letters and the fi ctional index, 
composed of the fi ctive narrator, time, and location of the sentence to-
ken wherein the name is introduced in fi ction: e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
(Watson, end of 19th century, London).12 The name coming from (4) is 
individuated by the fi ctional index of the token it is taken from. Neither 
the location nor the time need be very specifi c. If the specifi c index is 
not given (or known), we can have: (narrator of t, time of t, location of 
t).13 T is a token of the fi ctional name found in the fi ction. The index 
gives the source of the name. I call it the indexed token of the fi ctional 
name. Names like ‘Vulcan’, not coming from fi ction, are not assigned a 
fi ctional index. A fi ctional name can be extracted from a fi ctional sen-
tence with its index, and then proceeds to have a life of its own. For 
example, ‘Sherlock Holmes’, ‘Raskolnikov’, ‘Madame de Villeparisis’ 
and ‘William of Baskerville’ are all famous fi ctional names coming from 
fi ctions and having a life of their own. Sometimes the narrator has a 
name, Adso of Melk for instance, and a time as well as a place, are pro-
vided. Time and location can be fuzzy and not very specifi c—a year or 
a city—as is usually the case in fi ction. Readers often do not even know 
who the fi ctional narrator is. In the same way, they do not care much 
about the time of the writing. They also very often ignore the location 
of the writing. Except when they are essential to an understanding of 
the story, these features are just irrelevant to most readers. Hence, the 
narrator of the name, the time and the location of the writing are used 
only sometimes. In any event, the fi ctional status of the name ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ is echoed in the truth conditions of the utterance of (1). That 
being said, ‘Watson’ is also a fi ctional name and it needs to be indexed 
as well: e.g., ‘Watson’ <Watson, London, end of 19th century>. Being 
indexed is a characteristic of fi ctional names. Given the scope of the 
present paper, I will set aside the issue of indexing the name used by 
the fi ctive narrator.
A fi ctional name can be used outside of the context of the fi ctional 
work that it originated from, while nevertheless keeping its identify-
ing fi ctional index as in an utterance of (1). All fi ctional name tokens 
have a fi ctional index. If a name does not, then the name refers directly 
11 In that respect, its role is very different from, and should not be confused with, 
the role of indexes in theories of indexicals. Fictional indexes are introduced and 
used to account for fi ctional names in Vallée 2018.
12 I give a minimal fi ctional index, and leave it as an open question whether more 
indices should be added.
13 Different sequences of phonemes should be considered because in different 
languages (Russian, Japanese, French, and so on) names are written and pronounced 
in different ways. I put aside this issue for now.
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to its designata by default. Knowing that a name is fi ctional means 
knowing that it has a fi ctional index, and vice-versa. In day-to-day ca-
sual conversation about Holmes the index is mostly left unspecifi ed 
and remains in the background. Consequentially, casual conversations 
involving fi ctional names are occasionally unclear, since they involve 
utterances which have no well determined truth conditions. As a re-
sult, sometimes it is necessary to pause the conversation in order to 
clarify which ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is relevant. Different tokens of a fi c-
tional name sentence such as ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’, whether 
they are found on a school wall, a London bus or a piece of paper in a 
Chinese cookie, do not indicate whether the name used is a fi ctional 
name, the name of a London detective, or the name of an American 
cowboy. Regardless, the name is indexed, and this is what makes it the 
specifi c fi ctional name as found in Doyle’s mystery, for example.
6. On Fictional Names and Pluri-Propositionalism
Let us return to the questions concerning fi ctional names and exis-
tence. Mono-propositionalism is a framework assumed by all currently 
proposed theories of fi ctional names. Pluri-propositionalism provides 
a new perspective through which we can examine them. Consider a 
sentence such as (1). Without specifying whether or not it is a fi ctional 
name the questions can hardly be answered since one has to index the 
fi ctional name. The new pluri-propositionalist framework focuses on 
utterances instead of sentences. Rather than being individuated by its 
referent, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is individuated by the fi ctive narrator, the 
time and location of the indexed token: e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes’ <Wat-
son, end of 19th century, London >.
‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a fi ctional name possessing a fi ctional index 
that it carries with it in utterances of the name in ordinary conversa-
tion, e.g., conversations where (1) is uttered. A speaker’s knowledge of 
the name is also echoed in their understanding of the truth conditions 
of an utterance such as (1). In the case of (1), we may have something 
like
 Given that (1) is an English sentence, the utterance u of (1) is 
true if and only if the individual that the convention exploited 
by the utterance u allows us to designate by ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
(Watson, end of 19th century, London) exists.
The truth conditions of this utterance give its cognitive signifi cance. A 
speaker needs nothing more than these truth conditions to identify the 
cognitive signifi cance. In the truth conditions associated with an utter-
ance of (1), ‘the individual that the convention exploited by the utter-
ance u allows us to designate by ‘Sherlock Holmes’’—where the name 
is indexed—echoes the fact that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a fi ctional name.14 
14 The cognitive signifi cance containing a name does not make it about that 
name, and it does not make it metalinguistic.
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I know that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in (1) is a fi ctional name, and that the 
truth conditions mentioned give the truth conditions of the utterance 
of (1). Not surprisingly, an utterance of (1) has a descriptive content, 
which is captured in the truth conditions of the utterance. An utterance 
of (1) can be accepted as true, but it is not true given facts. Suppose that 
you believe that Sherlock Holmes is a real individual. Then you may 
proceed to assign an utterance of (1) different truth conditions. 
 Given that (1) is an English sentence, the utterance u of (1) is true 
if and only if the individual that the convention exploited by the 
utterance u allows us to designate by ‘Sherlock Holmes’ exists.
You and I may assign different truth conditions to an utterance of (1), 
and the utterance also has different cognitive signifi cance for you and 
I. Moreover, I will not look for a designational content, whereas you 
may. There is no need to invoke a fi ctional character to account for 
our disagreement. In addition, the latter is purely cognitive. It does 
not, and it cannot, invoke a designational content containing Sherlock 
Holmes, as a real or even as a fi ctional creature. In any case, invoking 
a fi ctional creature is not required in order to account for the facts. The 
identifi cation of a specifi c ‘Sherlock Holmes’, for instance, is often done 
indirectly, by means of the name of the author, the title of the book, the 
title of the movie or the television series, the name of the actor playing 
Holmes, etc. These are not fi ction-relative parameters. Questions per-
taining specifi cally to names can then be asked again: is the name in 
Doyle’s book and the name in a television series the same name? Read-
ers of A Study in Scarlet assume that every token of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ 
in the book has the same fi ctional index. Readers of the other books of 
Doyle’s featuring Holmes assume that tokens of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in 
these books have the same or similar indexes. In saying this, I am go-
ing beyond fi ctional names and I am talking about the readers of the 
fi ction. Clearly, this is not part of my view on fi ctional names. 
Moreover, there is no convention tying a fi ctional name to a three-
dimensional individual. An informed speaker using a fi ctional name 
knows that there is no such convention, and knows the cognitive signif-
icance of an utterance of (1). Such a speaker also knows the difference 
between the truth conditions as cognitive signifi cance of an utterance 
involving ordinary names, and the truth conditions as cognitive signifi -
cance of an utterance involving fi ctional names. I’ll let the reader give 
the truth conditions of an utterance of (2). There is no need to explore 
whether or not they are the same name in (1) and (2) here. In any case, 
the answer will not depend on facts. Accepting as true a fi ctional in-
dexed token, or sentences containing fi ctional names, also allows us to 
set aside the famous prefi x or complex operator ‘It is true in the story’ 
and any reference to a story.
The fi ctional name itself is part of the cognitive signifi cance of an ut-
terance of the sentence. If a speaker does not assign an utterance of (1) 
such truth conditions, then that speaker does not know that the name 
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is fi ctional. If the fi ctional name is poorly individuated, i.e., if it is not 
assigned a clear index, then the utterance lacks clear truth conditions 
and its cognitive signifi cance is unclear. I contend that utterances con-
taining fi ctional names carry no truth conditions confronted with facts. 
The initial questions concerning existence can only be about semanti-
cally determined content or the cognitive signifi cance of the utterance. 
An utterance of (1), or (2), can be accepted as true, but this assumes or 
implies nothing concerning facts, i.e., it is not true relative to facts. If 
the utterance is about designational content, then it is assumed that 
there is a designational content and that the name refers to an object. 
The fi ctional name is then wrongly seen as having the same function 
as an ordinary name. If we accept utterances of sentences containing 
fi ctional names such as ‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ or ‘Sherlock Holmes 
does not exist’ as true, it is not because we have assessed it as true 
considering facts, since on the account developed here such a sugges-
tion is altogether incoherent. Puzzles concerning the existence, or non-
existence, of Sherlock Holmes concerned with facts are grounded on a 
reading of utterances such as (1) and (2) which misleadingly focuses on 
the purported designational content of the utterances, while there is 
none—when instead the emphasis should be the cognitive signifi cance 
of such utterances.
Reasons to accept or reject an utterance of (1) can differ widely. 
Determining whether an utterance such as ‘Obama exists’ expresses 
a true or false proposition is rather straightforward, since we simply 
have to check the facts. However, determining whether utterances of 
(1) and (2) determine proposition one accepts as true, or reject as false, 
is more complicated, since it relies on things such as the name’s in-
dividuation grounded on non-linguistic knowledge, knowledge of the 
name as fi ctional, the use of an index for that name, views on fi ction, 
and so on.
So far, I have addressed the truth-value problem. The contradiction 
problem is a little more complicated but it is rather easy to deal with on 
my account. An utterance of
      (5) Sherlock Holmes exists and Sherlock Holmes does not exist
is intuitively a contradiction if the same fi ctional name (i.e., a name 
with the same fi ctional index) occurs in both elementary sentences. 
One can say that it is a contradiction, not because of facts, but be-
cause prima facie both sentences cannot be accepted as true by ratio-
nal speaker. However, it can be accepted as a true contradiction if, for 
whatever reasons, an utterance of an identity sentence with the fi rst 
name with a fi ctional index and the second name with the same fi c-
tional index is accepted as true. In any case, assessing an utterance of 
(5) as a contradiction is grounded on linguistic competence only.
We are left with the belief attribution problem. Consider an utter-
ance of
      (6) Donald Trump believes that Sherlock Holmes exists.
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An utterance of (6) can be assigned truth conditions. Fixing the referent 
of ‘Donald Trump’, we have, with ‘Sherlock Holmes’ as a fi ctional name:
 Given that (6) is an English sentence, the utterance u of (6) is 
true if and only if DONALD TRUMP believes that what the 
convention exploited by the utterance allows us to designate by 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ (Watson, end of 19th century, London) exists.
The belief attributed is fully descriptive. He might also believe that 
Holmes is real. We then have: 
 Given that (6) is an English sentence, the utterance u of (6) is 
true if and only if DONALD TRUMP believes that what the 
convention exploited by the utterance allows us to designate by 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ exists.
where ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is, wrongly, believed to be an ordinary name. 
These are attributions of different beliefs. Of course, Trump cannot 
have a belief about a singular proposition containing Holmes himself.
We, therefore, have two options—corresponding to one reading 
where ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is an ordinary referring name, and another 
where it is a fi ctional name. It is interesting to be able to capture these 
two options and to make them clear in the truth conditions, as cogni-
tive signifi cance, assigned to utterances. We can also have 
      (7) Donald Trump believes that Sherlock Holmes does not exist
with ‘Sherlock Holmes’ as a fi ctional name. An utterance of (7) can be 
assigned truth conditions
 Given that (7) is an English sentence, the utterance u of (7) is 
true if and only if DONALD TRUMP believes that what the 
convention exploited by the utterance allows us to designate by 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ (Watson, end of 19th century, London) does not 
exist.
Finally, it is also possible that the same fi ctional name as used in (7) is 
also used in (8)
      (8) Obama believes that Sherlock Holmes does not exist.
We can assign an utterance of (8) the following truth conditions and a 
descriptive content:
 Given that (8) is an English sentence, the utterance u of (8) is 
true if and only if OBAMA believes that what the convention 
exploited by the utterance allows us to designate by ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ (Watson, end of 19th century, London) does not exist.
In no case is a belief in a singular proposition attributed. Trump and 
Obama can be attributed the same belief about ‘Sherlock Holmes’, such a 
belief being about the cognitive signifi cance of an utterance. However, (7) 
and (8) might also attribute different beliefs—(7) might contain the name 
found in Doyle’s books and (8) the name found in a television series.
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7. Conclusion
Mono-propositionalism, based on Frege’s ground breaking introduc-
tion of senses in semantics or based on singular propositions, is not a 
framework fi t to account for fi ctional names and the truth conditions 
of sentences containing fi ctional names. Pluri-propositionalism offers a 
new perspective on such sentences. Is an utterance of (9)
      (9) Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes
where the fi rst occurrence of the name is about the 19th century de-
tective—‘Sherlock Holmes’ with an index containing Watson, end of 
19th century and London,—and the second about the 21st century detec-
tive—with an index containing Watson, the 21st century and London—
true? The question as to whether the fi rst Watson is the second Watson 
remains open here. One must make a distinction between the cognitive 
signifi cance of the utterance and its designational content. The utter-
ance of (9) has no designational content and it is not truth assessable 
relative to the facts. Unfortunately, or fortunately, reasons to accept or 
reject the utterance of (9) will remain forever an object of speculation. 
The awkwardness of an utterance of ‘Frank Serpico is a detective, and 
so is Sherlock Holmes’ is made clear once the cognitive signifi cance of 
the utterance is considered. An utterance u is true, if and only if, the 
individual that the convention exploited by the utterance u allows us to 
designate by ‘Franck Serpico’ is a detective, and also if and only if, the 
individual that the convention exploited by the utterance u allows us to 
designate by ‘Sherlock Holmes’ (Watson, end of 19th century, London) is 
also a detective. The fi rst sentence determines a designational content 
containing an individual, whereas the second does not.
Fictional names do not refer to fi ctional or possible objects. If I am 
right, a fi ctional name is not a variable assigned a value, and it cannot 
be modeled along these lines: there simply is neither an assignment 
nor a value. A fi ctional name is a sequence of letters, which is indexed 
to a fi ction, with a fi ctional narrator, a time, and a location. This alter-
native picture opens up new perspectives on fi ctional names and, in a 
sense, on fi ction itself. Understanding sentences containing fi ctional 
names is a purely cognitive affair and it does not require invoking fi c-
tional entities. I do not wish to deny the ontological problems raised by 
fi ction or to disqualify an examination of fi ctional creatures (see Thom-
asson 1990, Voltolini 2006, Sainsbury 2014, Kripke 2013). Whatever 
these problems, they have no impact on my view, and, I submit, on the 
semantics of fi ctional names. It also suggests they do not depend on 
fi ctional names in stories. By the same token, fi ctional names have no 
impact on ontological issues concerning fi ction.
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